From: The Encyclopedia of Canada's Peoples/Immigration Policy/Harold Troper
In the mid-1960s, with the economy still in the doldrums and immigration numbers flat, both white and nonwhite arrivals seemed to take a back seat to administrative juggling. Responsibility for immigration was shifted from Citizenship and Immigration to a newly established Department of Manpower and Immigration. The government’s underlying intent was clear enough. Although they did not deny the social impact of immigration on Canadian society, a first priority of Ottawa’s economic planners was to kick-start a sluggish economy. The new look in immigration administration was fashioned to complement this economic emphasis. Bureaucratic change signalled that immigration would be even more tailored to short-term national employment goals.
In the mid-1960s officials also wrestled with another issue: illegal immigrants. Of course, Canada’s problem in this area was not as great as that of the United States. Long a magnet to the dispossessed, bordering on a poor and developing country to the south, and in closer proximity to the Hispanic and Caribbean world, the American republic seemed awash in illegal immigrants. But Canada also had its share. Among those illegally in this country were persons who had overstayed tourist visas, Asians smuggled into Canada, and the extended families of individuals who had misrepresented the closeness of their relationship in order to gain entry. The illegals also included those desperate for a safe harbour from poverty, persecution, and social decay.
The authorities seemed overwhelmed by the problem. Catching and deporting illegal immigrants drained administrative resources, and the cabinet was unsure what policy to follow. It proved both unwilling to commit money enough to hire and train staff to deal with the paperwork generated by illegal immigrants and reluctant to unleash the police in a wholesale crackdown on the illegals, many of whom were working as low-paid domestics or in other menial jobs. But if something was not done to deal with the problem, some warned, it would grow progressively worse.
Unable or unwilling to enforce its own regulations, the government did the next best thing: it changed the rules, at least temporarily. Hoping for an administrative breathing-space in which it might reassess its regulations and procedures, it authorized the first of several amnesties for illegal immigrants. If they had come forward and been regularized, the problem would have been resolved at low cost. But it was not settled that easily. Not trusting government – any government – many illegals did not declare themselves. In any event, some critics warned that making legal immigrants out of illegals did not deal with the real problem: the desperate need of people to escape poverty, persecution, and hopelessness. Canada promised such people sanctuary and hope, even outside the law.
Partly in anticipation of finding a solution to the problem, the government commissioned a major review of Canadian immigration, and a white paper was released in 1966. The document, infused with the liberal rhetoric of the day, called for a complete and thorough overhaul of Canadian immigration law, regulations, and procedures, including a rejection of any remaining hint of racial or ethnic discrimination. While this change was hailed as a long overdue reform, some viewed other policy recommendations of the white paper with alarm. Perhaps reflecting the larger public debate in the 1960s about optimum population size, the document questioned the long-term wisdom of absorbing too many job-hungry immigrants at the prime of their fertility cycle.
Although far from the Malthusian warnings of an earlier day and certainly not endorsing zero population growth, the white paper’s recommendations were still a minefield of controversy. It called for one-on-one links between Canada’s immediate labour needs and immigration, as much to provide a check on population growth as to serve economic self-interest. But particularly upsetting was the parallel recommendation for tightening up of family reunification. The white paper proposed that landed immigrants, those not yet citizens, be allowed to sponsor only immediate dependants. Canadian citizens could sponsor only those relatives who satisfied the educational and occupational qualifications then required of other applicants. The consequences of these suggested moves would be to curtail sharply the possibility of sponsoring family members.
Perhaps still unaware of the controversy developing over the family-reunification issue, cabinet referred the white paper to the Parliamentary Committee on Immigration for discussion. The committee was deluged with comments. The leaders of ethnic groups rejected any narrowing of the family and sponsorship categories. They warned that voters would take revenge on any political party that slammed the door on their relatives. Ethnic leaders were joined by church and labour groups in demanding a broadening, not a narrowing, of family-reunification provisions in immigration regulations. Members of Parliament, especially those with immigrant constituents who threatened to take campaign contributions and votes elsewhere, came out strongly on the side of family sponsorship. In an effort to deflect the political impact, the government set aside the proposed changes, at least as they were recommended in the white paper.
To the degree that Ottawa retreated, pan-ethnic lobbying seemed to have won two victories. Most obviously, the family-reunification recommendations in the white paper were abandoned. But there was another and conceivably more significant victory. By forcing the government to retreat, was a newly empowered immigrant and ethnic constituency serving notice of its coming of age in Canadian political life? Or was this ethnic lobbying a political aberration, a one-time single-issue coalition of disparate groups? In the wake of the debate, political commentators speculated as to whether yesterday’s immigrants would be tomorrow’s power brokers – a so-called third force, the ethnic vote.
Although the government scuttled plans to enact the white paper’s recommendations on family reunification, the issue did not disappear. In the end, Ottawa took away a little with one hand and gave much with the other. The list of those entitled to enter Canada as first-degree relatives was narrowed. But at the same time, a new category of immigrant, a nominated class, was announced. These immigrants, primarily non-dependent family members who could show a demonstrated ability to integrate with a minimum of difficulty, were given priority in processing. The class would consist of individuals previously ineligible for family reunification and, in some cases, unlikely to be admitted to Canada as independent immigrants. For their Canadian sponsor or nominator, much of the legal liability assumed in the case of immediate family was removed. But if the nomination provision was designed to cap family immigration, it failed. For many years, the largest single group of immigrants admitted into Canada has been in the family or other sponsored categories.
The 1966 white paper was not completely discarded, however. One year later, in response to one of its key recommendations, in 1967 all vestiges of racial and ethnic discrimination were officially expunged from Canadian immigration regulations and procedures, including the sponsored and nominated classes. The privilege of applying to bring in family members was extended to citizens and landed immigrants alike, including those from the developing world.
At the same time as Ottawa restructured family-reunification regulations and ended racial and ethnic preferences, it also overhauled the procedures by which regular or independent applicants were admitted into Canada. Again without enacting new legislation, the government both put a check on the discretionary powers of immigration officials to reject an applicant and coordinated admissions more exactly with fluctuations in the domestic economy. A “point system,” as it came to be known, was instituted to measure each independent applicant’s qualifications in a series of categories. Points were granted for specific skills, background, or Canadian links. In addition to education and employment experience, they were awarded for an individual’s personal character, market demand for his or her particular skills, English- or French-language proficiency, age, proposed Canadian destination, and prearranged employment. As conditions in Canada changed, the point system could be altered on very short notice. While the interviewing immigration officer could still award several discretionary points, it was the iron law of mathematics, not the vagaries of subjective assessment, that now counted most.
